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Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names 
that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for 
us because we are waiting for it. 
        Alain Badiou1 
 
As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, 
since I do not abstain from saying something, but rather abandon a certain 
combination of words as senseless. In another sense, however, philosophy 
does require a resignation, but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe 
that is what makes it so difficult for many. It can be difficult not to use an 
expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of rage. 
       Ludwig Wittgenstein2 
Introduction 
Alain Badiou’s Being and Event is a late product of the French reception of 
Heidegger’s philosophy, as inflected by the philosophy program of the École 
Normale Supérieure (ENS). This program is a kind of forcing house for the 
production of a national philosophical elite, owing to its monopoly of the state 
funding, training, and examination of trainee philosophy teachers destined for French 
high schools and colleges.3 A variety of cultural and political movements have 
contended for dominance of the ENS philosophy program — Christian 
phenomenology, Catholic existentialism, Kantian rationalism, “scientific Marxism” 
— yet Heideggerian thought seems to have provided a kind of matrix for the 
contestation itself. This brokering function has been due less to the precise doctrines 
                                                
* Thanks go to Rex Butler, Conal Condren, Simon Duffy, Barry Hindess, Wayne 
Hudson, Dominic Hyde, Jeffrey Minson, and Knox Peden for their comments on various 
drafts. Needless to say, none of these colleagues is responsible for the remaining errors. 
1  Alain Badiou, “Caesura of Nihilism”, in The Adventure of French Philosophy, trans. 
B. Bosteels (London, 2012), pp. 53-66, at p. 65. 
2  Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, TS 213, trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. 
E. Aue (Oxford, 2005), p. 300e.  
3  See the indispensable discussion in Edward Baring, The Young Derrida and French 
Philosophy, 1945-1968 (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 42-7, 67-80, 82-107.  
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of Heidegger than to the role of Heideggerianism as an underlying intellectual 
subculture capable of shaping basic attitudes towards doctrines, including their 
acceptance, contestation, and further elaboration.  
For our immediate purposes the salient feature of Husserlian and Heideggerian 
thought is that it gave rise to a line of French philosophy in which formal languages 
— formal logics and mathematics — are treated as standing in some kind of relation 
to a domain of experience or events, hence in relation to the subject of this domain 
and, finally, in relation to a Being that manifests (and conceals) itself through such 
languages and their subject.4 This line was thus preoccupied with the relation between 
“logic” and “psychology” and more broadly that between “rationalism” and 
“phenomenology”.5 The alternative path, as prospected by Wittgenstein, is one in 
which formal (and other) languages stand in no relation to a domain of experience 
and its subject, and are instead viewed as autonomous calculi or “grammars”.6 These 
are responsible for forming an array of calculative capacities by virtue of their 
concrete operations or uses, and thus manifest nothing beyond these operations and 
uses and the “ways of living” of which they form part. In treating formal languages in 
terms of “names” that manifest and conceal Being in the subject, Badiou’s Being and 
Event emerged from the main Heideggerian stream of French philosophical culture, 
as this was channeled into the factional currents that flowed through the ENS. I shall 
show that Badiou’s work took shape through the purely historical superimposition of 
a particular kind of philosophical mathematics — Cantor’s set theory — onto the 
infrastructure of Heidegger’s metaphysics. This gave rise to a discourse whose 
intelligibility is conditioned by the philosophical subculture that made this 
                                                
4  For a characteristic instance of this line of reception, see Jacques Derrida, Edmund 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (Lincoln, 1989), first published in 1962.  
5  For an illuminating conspectus of French philosophy written in these terms, see Knox 
Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze 
(Stanford CA, 2014), in particular pp. 17-65, where Jean Cavaillès is discussed as promoting 
set theory as an “immanent rationalism” capable of resolving the tension between 
psychologism and transcendental formalism. 
6  Cf., these characteristic snippets from The Big Typescript: “No psychological process 
can symbolize better than signs on paper. A psychological process can’t accomplish any more 
than written signs on paper. For again and again one is tempted to want to explain a symbolic 
process by a particular psychological process, as if the psyche could do much more in this 
matter than signs” (221e). And: “Mathematics consists entirely of calculations. In 
mathematics everything is algorithm, nothing meaning; even when it seems there’s meaning 
because we appear to be speaking about mathematical meanings in words. What we’re really 
doing in that case is simply constructing an algorithm with those words. In set theory what is 
calculus ought to be separated from what claims to be (and of course cannot be) theory” 
(494e). 
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superimposition possible, meaning that it is restricted to the “pedagogical geography” 
of the ENS and to the international academic archipelago — of continental 
philosophy courses, literary theory programs, and associated reading groups — in 
which this subculture can be partially reproduced. 
In proposing to develop an historical description of Badiou’s discourse in these 
terms, my approach differs from most others in two regards. First, I do not approach 
the question of whether set theory is the ambivalent (manifesting and concealing) 
exponent of Being as something that is capable of being true or false, hence as 
something that an historian can or should answer. Rather, I treat this question as 
internal to Badiou’s discourse, which means that the task of the historian is not 
answer it but to describe the philosophical subculture that requires it be asked, thence 
to cease asking. Second, I do not treat historical events as moments in which the 
transcendent manifests (or conceals) itself in time, but as purely temporal occurrences 
that have been recorded in various kinds of writing that can in turn be deciphered and 
interpreted within historiographic writing. I thus approach Badiou’s discourse on the 
ambivalent manifesting and concealing of Being in set theory as a historical 
occurrence: more specifically as an activity, taking place in post-war French 
philosophical institutions, whose discursive operations and uses are open to historical 
description. Were this description to fulfill its envisaged aims then it would result not 
in the invalidation of Badiou’s discourse but in the suspension of two affective 
attitudes towards it: namely, the desire for this discourse among those who think it 
capable of truth, and the disdain for it among those who think it evidently false or 
nonsensical. 
My description will be focused on a particular reciprocal interplay that Badiou 
establishes between his two key intellectual sources: Cantorian set theory and 
Heideggerian metaphysics. On the one hand, Badiou deploys set theory as a kind of 
extended allegory or symbology for the basic doctrines of Heideggerian metaphysics. 
On the other hand, he simultaneously uses set theory to mathematize this 
metaphysics, transposing it from theological and poetic registers into the formal and 
mathematical. Badiou’s central thesis that “mathematics is ontology” is thus not a 
statement within a particular theoretical discipline. Rather, it is a figure of thought 
formed in the space between the deployment of set theory as an allegory for 
Heideggerian ontology, and the transposition of the latter into a set-theoretic 
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symbolism, in a discursive operation that takes place wholly within the French 
Heideggerian subculture. 
It is significant that Badiou himself locates his work in something like this 
double-sided space: 
Our goal is to establish the meta-ontological thesis that mathematics is the 
historicity of the discourse on being qua being. And the goal of this goal 
is to assign philosophy to the thinkable articulation of two discourses (and 
practices) which are not it: mathematics, science of being, and the 
intervening doctrines of the event, which, precisely, designate “that-
which-is-not-being-qua-being”.7 
Needless to say, Badiou treats this combination of “mathematical ontology” and 
(Heideggerian) “doctrines of the event” as justified by the truth that it makes available 
to a privileged subject. I will approach it though as a pedagogical assemblage whose 
role is to form a subject or persona —  a particular way of acceding to truth — 
through the administration of specific intellectual or “spiritual” exercises. In any case, 
I shall show that all of Badiou’s key figures of thought are contained within this 
double-sided discourse, which exhausts the discursive space of Being and Event. 
Proposing to treat it as a describable product of the allegorical imposition of set 
theory on Heideggerian metaphysics might seem like a singularly unpromising 
approach to Badiou’s discourse. In the first place, Badiou insists that the domain of 
describable objects is only the presentation of something “unpresentable” or 
“indiscernible”, and he claims that the passage from the unpresentable to the 
describable can only be accessed via his own “metaontological” discourse.8 This 
would mean of course that Badiou’s discourse could not itself be treated as an object 
of empirical description. Second, despite acknowledging Heidegger as the last great 
philosopher, there are several passages in Being and Event where Badiou explicitly 
differentiates his metaontology from Heidegger’s. This occurs most emphatically in 
his claim that Heidegger’s theme of the “poetic” unfolding of forgotten Being has 
been “interrupted” and superseded by “mathematical ontology” or the “matheme”, 
                                                
7  Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. O. Feltham (London & New York, 2005), p. 13. 
(All further references given in text. All emphases are original).  
8  Again the contrast with Wittgenstein’s views is striking and illuminating, as we can 
see from the latter’s succinct comment that: “Because mathematics is a calculus and therefore 
really about nothing, there isn’t any metamathematics”. Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, p. 
372e. 
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according to which Being is understood “subtractively”, in terms of the formal 
generation of multiples (or sets) from the “void” (BE, 123-29). 
I will not engage further with the first of these possible objections since, in 
presuming that the describable is the manifestation of an indescribable Being 
accessible only through Badiou’s meta-discourse, it would foreclose that which my 
discussion proposes as an open question: that is, the question of whether Badiou’s 
discourse is open to an empirical historical description. We can thus set aside this 
metatheoretical objection on methodological grounds, as question-begging, and 
proceed to a description that can succeed or fail in its own terms, according to 
whether readers find it to be an accurate and fruitful account, or not. The second 
possible objection must be met head-on, however; for were it to hold then our 
proposed description would indeed fail, owing to its inaccurate characterization of 
Badiou’s discourse as Heideggerian. Here our response will be to show that, 
notwithstanding his explicit points of distanciation from Heidegger, Badiou’s 
discourse takes place entirely within what is in fact the fundamental Heideggerian 
figure of thought: namely, the theme of the concealment of Being through the very 
forms (or beings) in which it is disclosed.9 According to this recherché thought-
figure, there is an ontological font of all things (“Being”) that is only disclosed in and 
to a subject who calls it forth (Dasein for Heidegger); but this disclosure is 
simultaneously a concealment, for Being reveals itself only by calling the subject into 
existence, and hence is not something the subject knows but what it is.10 This is not to 
deny that there are other more local sources for Badiou’s discourse — in particular 
Lacan’s psychoanalysis and Althusser’s formalist Marxism — only to assert that 
these too take place within the Heideggerian subculture, permitting Lacan, for 
example, to superimpose Freud’s unconscious on Heidegger’s unpresentable Being. 
In fact at no point in Being and Event does Badiou raise the question of why 
someone would believe that there is such a thing as Being, harboured in the “void” as 
unpresentable infinities, and summoned into knowable existence by a subject whom it 
summons into existence for just this purpose. Somewhat remarkably, he simply 
                                                
9  For a quite different kind of argument that Heidegger remains central to Badiou’s 
discourse, see Graham Harman, “Badiou's Relation to Heidegger in Theory of the Subject”, in 
Badiou and Philosophy, ed. S. Bowden and S. Duffy (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 225-43.  
10  For a reasonably compact and accessible formulation of this figure of thought by 
Heidegger, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. J. 
Stambaugh (New York, 1996), pp. 56-8. And for a routine expression by Badiou, see the 
epigraph to this paper. 
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accepts this extraordinary mythopoeic figure of thought without comment or question. 
In this regard, Badiou’s work may be regarded as embedded in a Heideggerian 
theology or confession. No less surprising for a non-believer is the fact that Badiou 
treats Cantor’s “invention” of set theory as the “event” through which, for the first 
time in the history of humanity, it became possible for the disclosure (and 
concealment) of unpresentable Being to occur within a scientific discourse. It is this 
extraordinary allegorization of an unquestioned Heideggerian metaphysics in a formal 
mathematical symbology that gives Badiou’s discourse its intensity and 
portentousness, even imbuing it with messianic and apocalyptic overtones.11 
As we shall now see, Heidegger’s figure of the simultaneous disclosure and 
concealment of Being in beings sits at the centre of Badiou’s discourse. It forms the 
reciprocating hinge between his deployment of set-theoretic mathematics as a 
symbology for Heideggerian metaphysics, and his translation of this metaphysics into 
the language of formal mathematics. Badiou’s discourse thus presents a picture in 
which the entirety of “being qua being” or “nature” is generated in the form of 
mathematical “multiples” or sets. These emerge in the form of “presentations” from a 
kind of super-calculus whose defining feature is that its operations remain 
“unpresentable” or “unthinkable”. In this regard, set theory in Badiou’s para-
Heideggerian discourse plays the same role as “writing” in Derrida’s, and both have 
been advanced as the means of diagnosing and superseding the “metaphysical” 
residue in Heidegger’s figure of the concealment of Being in beings.12 In treating 
meaning as concealed by the mechanisms that produce it, however, Badiou’s super-
calculus and Derrida’s “arche-writing” can themselves be regarded as rival variants of 
this figure, each advanced by a cultural-political faction intent on detecting and 
denouncing the last vestiges of “metaphysics” in its competitor. 
                                                
11  Perhaps it is their failure to fully grasp this nexus of mathematics and metaphysics 
that limits the otherwise helpful discussion of Being and Event by Ricardo and David 
Nirenberg. See, Ricardo L. Nirenberg and David Nirenberg, “Badiou's Number: A Critique of 
Mathematics as Ontology”, Critical Inquiry 37 (2011): 583-614. In any case, the passionate 
intensity with which Badiou’s followers adhere to his concealed revelation of Being is on full 
display in this response to the Nirenbergs: A. J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens, “II. Neither Nor”, 
Critical Inquiry 38 (2012): 365-80.  
12  For a helpful account of Derrida’s conception of “writing” as an attempt to supersede 
the “metaphysical” residue in Heidegger’s figure of the concealment of Being in beings, see 
Baring, The Young Derrida, pp. 191-203; although Baring seems to think that this attempt 
makes sense in its own terms, rather than being a Heideggerian improvisation, optional and 
equivalent to Badiou’s. 
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As in Heideggerian thought more generally, in Badiou’s “metaontology” it is the 
“event” that mediates the dark passage between an unpresentable ground of Being 
and the beings as and in whom it is presented. Here the subject operates in a dual 
register: as the being that names the event, calling the unpresentable into existence as 
a “presentational multiple” through an “intervention”, and as the being that is called 
into existence by a self-nominating event, in order to bear mute testimony to the 
disclosure of unpresentable Being: “It is certain that the event alone, aleatory figure 
of non-being, founds the possibility of intervention. It is just as certain that if no 
intervention puts it into circulation … then, lacking any being … the event does not 
exist” (BE, 209). It might seem surprising that something so ineffable could be so 
certain, and yet this is repeatedly the case in Badiou’s discourse. 
The basic itinerary of my description has thus been established. I shall begin with 
an account of Badiou’s emblematic presentation of the “null-set” and transfinite 
numbers, and then discuss his meditations on the event and the subject. This will 
allow me to complete the paper with an account of Badiou’s deployment of the 
model-theoretic procedure of “forcing” as a Heideggerian allegory for “discerning the 
indiscernible”, or “naming unnamable being”. 
The Null-Set and the Transfinite (Nothing and Everything) 
Badiou introduces his twin constructions of the null or empty set and the 
transfinite numbers in order to set the inner and outer existential limits of his 
discourse. Formulated by Georg Cantor at the end of the nineteenth century, Badiou 
deploys these constructs to allow his metaontology to frame the entire ontological 
universe, between nothing and everything (BE, 30). He thus absorbs the traditional 
scholastic metaphysical project of comprehending all of the domains and kinds of 
being within a single originary science, originally the metaphysics of God’s 
intellection or emanation of all beings. But he transforms this into a metaontology of 
the emergence of multiple infinities of beings from a nothingness that anticipates 
them in the form of unpresentable or “inconsistent” mathematical operations (BE, 27-
8). This provides the intellectual setting that permits Badiou to allegorize the two 
technical constructs by transposing them into a particular metaphysical register. He 
thus treats the empty set as an emblem for the existentialist conception of the 
emergence of beings from nothingness or the “void”. And he treats Cantor’s 
transfinite numbers as symbolic of the supposed fact that the ontological universe 
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consists of a single homogenous domain of the enumerable, but one so vast that it 
outstrips any actual “constructive” enumeration and all “regional” natural sciences 
(BE, 52-9). 
In formal mathematics and logic the null or empty set is a technical construct 
called into existence by its operational uses, so much so that Dedekind’s foundations 
of arithmetic could exclude it, treating ‘1’ rather than ‘0’ as his foundation for the 
number system.13 In “extensional” set theory — that is, set theory premised on the 
calculation-independent existence of set members — the null or empty set, 
understood as the empty extension and symbolized by ∅, is a technical construct 
without any reference to Being or nothingness.14 Here its primary use is to show how 
the natural numbers can be constructed as sets of elements built up from the empty 
set, such that ∅= 0, {∅} = 1, {∅,{∅}} = 2, {∅,{∅},{∅,{∅}}} = 3, and so on, as 
part of the set-theoretic foundation or simulation of arithmetic.15 In Badiou’s 
allegorical deployment of it, however, the empty set is made to go proxy for Being, 
here not understood as the “one” as in Platonic and Christian metaphysics, but as a 
domain of unpresented or “unconscious” multiples whose “counting as one” gives 
rise to the sets of a presented “situation”.16 Since on this account to be presented (or 
thought) means to counted in or as a set, which is also what it means to exist, in not 
themselves being counted as one, the multiples of the empty set are both unpresented 
                                                
13  Richard Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of Numbers, trans. W. W. Beman (Chicago, 
1901), pp. 33-4. 
14  Akihiro Kanamori, “The Empty Set, the Singleton, and the Ordered Pair”, The 
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (2003): 273-98, at 273-76. 
15  The basic idea informing the extensionalist program at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was that all mathematical objects, numbers in particular, can be regarded as 
collections of abstract objects or sets, and formulated in expressions that reduce to the 
membership relation, ∈. Integers (“natural numbers”) can thus be treated as finite sets, 
rational numbers (“fractions”) as pairs of integers, “real” numbers as intervals in an infinitely 
expanding number line, and functions as sets of pairs. See, M. Randall Holmes, Elementary 
Set Theory with a Universal Set (Louvain, 1998), pp. 25-8. Here I do not discuss the 
controversy as to whether set theory provides a foundation for mathematics or simply a more 
abstract set of notations for it, but note Wittgenstein’s comment that the “logical calculus — 
is only frills tacked on to the arithmetical calculus”. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1978), p. 146. 
16  “Situation” is a central but somewhat mobile term for Badiou, combining three things 
that are normally kept apart: first, the (extensionalist) set-theoretic concept of “domain” as the 
values or n-tuple relations that “satisfy” a mathematical function; second, the “universe” of 
sets structured by first- and second-order logics as a “model” for a selected axiomatization of 
set theory; and thirdly and more informally an empirical state of affairs — a domain of facts, 
an “historical situation” — that Badiou nonetheless approaches as if it were a kind of set-
theoretic domain or model. 
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and “nothing”. For Badiou, however, this “nothing” also exists, in a special sense 
(“in-exists”), and is in fact the unpresentable source of all the sets (or “beings”) 
resulting from the mathematical operation “count as one”: “To put it more clearly, 
once the entirety of a situation is subject to the law of the one and consistency, it is 
necessary … that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresentable according to the count, 
be nothing. But being-nothing is as distinct from non-being as the ‘there is’ is distinct 
from being” (BE, 53). 
For Badiou the “nothing” emblematized in the empty set is thus the 
unpresentable or unconscious source of all of the enumerated sets that constitute the 
presentable ontological domain of “being qua being”. For mathematicians and 
mathematical logicians, however, sets have no source — no void, or domain of 
unpresentable Being — since the concepts of set and membership (∈) are treated as 
“primitive notions” incapable of further analysis, acting as the posits on which set 
theory is built through the employment of logical syntax and arithmetic operations.17 
In identifying it with the void, Badiou thus turns the empty set into an allegorical 
symbol of the Heideggerian link between thinkable things or beings and the 
unthinkable Being (or “being-nothing”) from which they are supposed to emerge. 
This allows him to freight the otherwise variable formal-syntactic notation of the 
empty set, ∅, with the Heideggerian-metaphysical meaning of the “suture to being” 
(BE, 66-9). In this way, the technical role of the empty set in the set-theoretic 
modeling of natural numbers is transmuted into an emblem of the existentialist and 
Heideggerian conception of nothingness or the void, understood as the unthinkable 
source of all thinkable or presentable things. In a characteristically paradoxical and 
gnomic comment, Badiou thus proclaims that: “The void is the name of being — of 
inconsistency — according to a situation, inasmuch as presentation gives us therein 
an unpresentable access, thus non-access, to this access, in the mode of the not-one, 
nor composable of ones; thus what is qualifiable within the situation solely as the 
errancy of the nothing” (BE, 56). 
We can note that the gnostic ineffability of this formulation pertains not just to 
its instantiation of the key Heideggerian thought-figure — the access to being that is 
also its occlusion — but also to the affective intensity with which Badiou presents it 
as a kind of sacred mystery at the very limits of human understanding. Badiou thus 
                                                
17  Thomas Jech, Set Theory, 3rd rev. ed. (Berlin, 2003), pp. 3-5; Paul J. Cohen, Set 
Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis (New York, 1966), pp. 3-7. 
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comments that in choosing the old Scandinavian symbol ∅ for the empty set, it is as 
if mathematicians were “dully aware that in proclaiming that the void alone is … they 
were touching on some sacred region, itself liminal to language” (BE, 69). For the 
moment though our attention is focused on the fact that Badiou treats the empty-set’s 
symbolization of the Heideggerian void not as an allegory but as an eminent truth, a 
posture that is assumed without further reflection by his followers.18 This of course is 
symptomatic of intense adherence to the Heideggerian thought-figure, which in turn 
leads Badiou to dismiss the fact that mathematicians do not treat the empty set as a 
symbol of the void as symptomatic of their failure to penetrate the unconscious 
grounds of their own practice (BE, 69). 
In tandem with the empty set as symbol of the void, Badiou designates the 
infinite or transfinite numbers of Cantorian set theory as the “second existential seal” 
of his metaontology, by which he means its second point of contact with Being (BE, 
156). This time ontological contact comes not in the form of the unpresentable 
multiples of the void that precede the “situation” of presented things or beings, but in 
the form of multiple infinities that constitute the situation yet stretch beyond it, 
constituting its “Other” (BE, 142-49). As an emblem of the Other — that is, of an 
incalculable plenitude of Being underpinning all calculable domains of knowledge — 
Badiou’s transfinite numbers represent a further use of set theory as a symbology for 
Heideggerian metaphysics.19 The technical complexity of Cantor’s mathematical 
construction of transfinite numbers, however, makes the task of describing Badiou’s 
allegorical use of them particularly challenging. 
Transfinite numbers emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century in the 
context of the long-running project to arithmetize the geometric line; that is, to 
replace geometric linear continuity with non-terminal arithmetically and algebraically 
                                                
18  For examples, see, Justin Clemens, “Platonic Meditations: The Work of Alain 
Badiou”, Pli 11 (2001): 200-29, at 217; Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth 
(Minneapolis, 2003), pp. 75, 101-103; Justin Clemens’ and Oliver Feltham’s introduction to 
Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed. and trans. J. Clemens 
and O. Feltham (New York, 2003), pp. 15-16; and Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: 
Enlightenment and Extinction (Houndmils, 2007), pp. 104-5. 
19  It can be noted that in an early work, in which Badiou puts Cantor’s transfinite 
numbers to the same Heideggerian use, he characterizes the incalculable and impossible 
infinitude inhabiting the calculable domain not as the “Other” but as the “real”, in accordance 
with Lacan’s pairing of the “symbolic” and the “real”. See, Alain Badiou, “Infinitesimal 
Subversion”, in Concept and Form, Volume One: Key Texts from the Cahiers pour l'Analyse, 
ed. P. Hallward and K. Peden (London, 2012), pp. 187-208, at pp. 189-93.  
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generated numbers or values, initially conceived as abstract points on the “number 
line”.20 Cantor’s conception of numbers as classes, sequences, or sets (Menge) of 
points marked the emergence of set theory a program for reconstructing number 
theory (and thence mathematics) by providing a common foundation for different 
number forms: natural, rational, and irrational (non-terminating and non-repeating 
decimal fractions such as π and the square root of 2).21 These could all be regarded as 
formed from the structuration and combination of sets of “points” occupying spaces 
on an abstract number line. Moving beyond the notion of “point-sets”, Cantor also 
invented two new kinds of number internal to set theory: cardinal numbers, which 
“counted” set size by establishing one-to-one relations between the members of 
equivalent sets; and ordinal numbers, which were designed to represent the order-
relations holding among the members within sets. Cantor could thus integrate rational 
and irrational numbers in the “real number line” by treating the irrational numbers 
(e.g., π as 3.14159 …) as expanding endlessly towards a “limit point” — the next 
rational number (e.g., 3.25) — that they never reach, thereby supposedly expanding in 
the “gaps” of the number line and providing an arithmetic or algebraic simulacrum of 
the geometric “continuum”. On this basis Cantor could construct “real” numbers as 
“gaps” or “intervals” in the number-line that are formed by the unending expansion of 
a sequence or set of numbers towards a “limit” number that is never reached.22 This in 
turn provided the basis for the set-theoretic conception of the infinite and “transfinite” 
numbers, now understood as “actual” or completed (rather than “potential”) infinity, 
since the “limit” numbers towards which they asymptotically unfolded supposedly 
already existed.23 Cantor could thus treat infinity as a super-large number, rather than 
just as a rule of expansion. And this in turn gave him the licence to posit multiple 
                                                
20  For pioneering papers see Georg Cantor, “Uber die Ausdehnung eines Satzes aus der 
Theorie der trigonometrischen Reihen”, Mathematische Annalen 5 (1872): 123-32; and 
Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of Numbers, pp. 1-13. For a helpful overview of these 
developments, written for students of law and the humanities, see Robert Hockett, “Reflective 
Intensions: Two Foundational Decision-Points in Mathematics, Law, and Economics”, 
Cardozo Law Review 29 (2008): 1967-2119. See also, Joseph W. Dauben, “Georg Cantor and 
the Battle for Transfinite Set Theory”, American Mathematical Society (New York, 1988).  
21  See note 15 above. 
22  See Cantor, “Uber die Ausdehnung eines Satzes aus der Theorie der 
trigonometrischen Reihen”, § 2. For a helpful commentary see Joseph W. Dauben, “The 
Trigonometric Background to Georg Cantor's Theory of Sets”, Archive for History of Exact 
Sciences 26 (1971): 181-216, at 202-8. 
23  Joseph W. Dauben, Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite 
(Princeton NJ., 1979), pp. 95-101. 
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infinities of different sizes or cardinalities that could be assigned algebraic symbols 
— the “aleph” (ℵ) symbol — and incorporated in arithmetic calculations. As we will 
see, Cantor’s hypothesized that one of these aleph cardinals (2N0 = ℵ1) represented 
the size of the continuum or set of all real numbers, giving rise to his “continuum 
theorem”. 
It is important to observe, even if only in passing, that Cantor’s construction of 
the real number line or continuum with its limit points and transfinite numbers 
belongs not just to a mathematical practice but also to a particular philosophy of 
mathematics. In treating the infinite number sequences or sets as existing as intervals 
in the “real number line”, supposedly prior to the algorithms or functions that 
“partially” expand them, Cantor’s construction presumes an extensional philosophy 
of mathematics as a theory of independently existing mathematical entities (points) 
and relations such as sets. Conversely, a significant minority of mathematicians and 
logicians, including Brouwer and Wittgenstein, insisted that mathematical quantities 
and relations are arrived at only through the actual performance of definite 
calculations or algorithms, having no independent existence — the “intensional” or 
“constructivist” viewpoint.24 This meant that they refused to accept that infinite point-
sets or number sequences existed beyond the actual arithmetic operations or algebraic 
functions through which sequences were finitely expanded.25 This is also why 
Wittgenstein rejected the notion of the real number line, since he regarded the 
different kinds of number that it supposedly contains — natural, cardinal, rational, 
irrational, and real — as the products of diverse algorithms or calculi, hence as 
incapable of being incorporated in a single calculus or of being regarded as 
“numbers” in the same sense.26 
Badiou rejects these intensional and constructivist views out of hand because of 
the manner in which they divorce mathematics from ontology, leading him to dismiss 
them as symptoms of the “unconscious” practice of “working mathematicians” (BE, 
247-52, 286-94). It is not our present concern to directly contest this move, only to 
                                                
24  For a summary statement of Brouwer’s “intuitionist” view of infinity, see Michael 
Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism (Oxford, 1977), pp. 51-6. For Wittgenstein’s parallel but 
distinct form of finitism, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1978), pp. 260-80. 
25  For a helpful overview of the two outlooks, written from the perspective of a 
moderate extensionalism, see Hockett, “Reflective Intensions”: 1990-2006. 
26  Wittgenstein, Big Typescript, pp. 489e-505e. 
 13 
describe its role in his discourse.27 Badiou’s discussion of transfinite numbers 
supervenes on this divergence within the history and philosophy of mathematics, but 
from a quite different, metaphysical, vantage-point. In fact Badiou’s approach is 
framed by his rejection of the Christian ontotheological conception of infinity — in 
terms the human mind’s finite participation in God’s singular infinite intellection of 
all possible things — and by his refusal of Heidegger’s conception of mathematics as 
the “forgetting of Being” (BE, 123-29, 142-49). Badiou argues that Cantor 
transformed prior ontotheological conceptions of infinity by relocating infinity within 
Galileo’s quantified “nature” — that is, within the number-sequences and classes of 
the real number line — this giving rise to a plurality of infinities. Badiou thus appeals 
to Cantor’s immanent multiple infinities to undermine transcendent ontotheology and 
to give a new disposition to Heidegger’s theme of the forgetting of Being. This could 
now be understood in terms of the oblivion into which the multiple infinities were 
cast by finite “situation” constructed from them. 
But Badiou gives Cantor a new disposition too. For while Badiou takes over 
Cantor’s extensionalist conception of the transfinite numbers — as pointing towards 
multiple infinities of mathematical objects that are only partially revealed in any 
given expansion or iteration of a rule — he simultaneously reinterprets this 
conception in a Heideggerian manner. He thus treats the expansion of a number series 
via a rule or algorithm as determining the identity of multiples (sets, beings, “others”) 
but only through an encounter with something that lies beyond all calculation and 
identity: namely, infinity as the Other that necessitates and outstrips all applications 
of the rule, ensuring they are only partial calculations (hence forgettings) of 
incalculable Being:  
Infinity is the Other on the basis of which there is — between the fixity of 
the already and the repetition of the still-more — a rule according to 
which the others are the same. 
The existential status of infinity is double. What is required is both the 
being-already-there of an initial multiple and the being of the Other which 
can never be inferred from the rule. This double existential seal is what 
                                                
27  For an argument that Badiou’s position shares important features in common with 
Brouwer’s intutionism, see Zachary Fraser, “The Law of the Subject: Alain Badiou, Luitzen 
Brouwer and the Kripkean Analyses of Forcing and the Heyting Calculus”, in The Praxis of 
Alain Badiou, ed. P. Ashton, A. J. Bartlett, and J. Clemens (Melbourne, 2006), pp. 23-70.  
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distinguishes real infinity from the imaginary of the one-infinity, which 
was posited as a single gesture” (BE, 147-48). 
Situated in this new metaphysical context, the mathematical meaning of Cantor’s 
limit numbers including limit ordinals — that is, their role in defining real numbers as 
the asymptotic limits of infinite number sequences — is radically transformed. For 
now Badiou deploys limit numbers as symbols of breaks in natural multiples that 
admit unpresentable Being in the form of an incalculably infinite Other:  
Take the sequence of successor ordinals which can be constructed, via the 
rule S, on the basis of an ordinal which belongs to a limit ordinal. This 
entire sequence unfolds itself “inside” that limit ordinal, in the sense that 
all the terms of the sequence belong to the latter. At the same time, the 
limit ordinal itself is Other, in that it can never be the still-one-more 
which succeeds an other. (BE, 154-55). 
In this way Badiou has redeployed the limit number as a metaphysical symbol of an 
infinite Other that outstrips and hence founds the finite mathematical unfolding of 
“natural” beings, just as we earlier saw him redeploying the empty set as a 
metaphysical symbol of the so-called void from which all beings (multiples, sets) are 
called into existence through their mathematical enunciation.28 
Badiou deploys the relation between the empty set and the transfinite numbers to 
displace the traditional metaphysical relation between the divine mind’s infinite 
intellection of all possible things and the human mind’s partial reflection of this 
infinity. The empty set or void is thus the hole that was once occupied by God, which 
allows Badiou to proclaim the atheist character of his metaontology (BE, 277). At the 
same time, however, Badiou’s void or “being-nothing” continues to serve the core 
function of the displaced metaphysical God: to be the source of all presentable things 
in the cosmos, hence to be the only thing that truly exists, albeit negatively as “in-
existent” and unpresentable: “It is quite true that prior to the count there is nothing 
because everything is counted. Yet this being-nothing — wherein resides the illegal 
inconsistency of being — is the base of there being the ‘whole’ of the compositions of 
ones in which presentation takes place” (BE, 54). Being and Event may thus be 
                                                
28  It should be noted that Badiou developed this basic position — i.e., treating infinity 
as indicative of an unpresentable “Other” or “real” lying beyond all algorithmic calculation 
— 20 years prior to the publication of Being and Event, as can be seen his “Infinitesimal 
Subversion” essay, first published in 1968.  
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regarded as a translation of negative theology into negative ontology, which is 
reflected in its significant reception among theologians.29 In deploying it as the sole 
threshold across which the unpresentable Being of the void finds enunciation and 
passes into presentation and the domain of “being qua being”, Badiou elevates his 
“metaontology” to the status of a sacred discourse whose role is to effect the “suture 
to Being”. This infuses his discourse with a quasi-holy aura and pre-eminence in 
relation to other merely historical or scientific disciplines, dictating that it be acceded 
to through rituals of initiation and conversion, as we shall now see. 
The Event and the Subject 
Elaborated in the dense set of meditations that comprise parts IV and V of Being 
and Event, Badiou’s intricate constructions of the “event” and the “subject” constitute 
the work’s philosophical centre. As in Heidegger’s discourse, so too in Badiou’s the 
role of the event is to effect a passage between the unpresentable and inexistent Being 
of the void, and the domain of presented things or beings — the “multiples” of a 
“situation” — that are supposed to emerge from the void via the event.30 As such, 
Badiou’s event is a metaphysically liminal or amphibious creature, moving unformed 
in the limitless ocean of unpresentable nothingness, but crossing the shoreline of 
presentational thinghood through a naming of the unnamable. Standing on this 
existential beach the subject is a similarly liminal figure, since it must be both the 
source of the name that calls the event into being, and a being that is called into 
existence by the event that it “encounters”. Given the contradictory constitutions 
imposed by their roles in effecting the passage from the unpresentable void to the 
world or “situation” of presented beings, it is not surprising that Badiou’s discourse 
                                                
29  See, for example, Kenneth A. Reynhout, “Alain Badiou: Hidden Theologian of the 
Void”, The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 219-33, whose central argument is that Badiou’s 
void is God. See also, David R. Brockman, No Longer the Same: Religious Others and the 
Liberation of Christian Theology (Houndmils, 2011), pp. 145-51; Frederiek Depootere, 
Badiou and Theology (London, 2009); and Hollis Phelps, Alain Badiou: Between Theology 
and Anti-Theology (London, 2013), pp. 121-68.  
30  One of Heidegger’s characteristic evocations of the event thus runs: “All the same, 
the task remains: the retrieval of beings out of the truth of beyng. … A projection of the 
essential occurrence of beyng as the event must be ventured, because we do not know that to 
which our history is assigned. Would that we might radically experience the essential 
occurrent of this unknown assignment in its self-concealing”. See, Martin Heidegger, 
Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu 
(Bloomington IND, 2012), pp. 11-12. 
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on the event and the subject should take the form of a series of structured paradoxes 
or aporiae. These, I shall argue, are in fact “spiritual exercises” required of the reader. 
The first of Badiou’s liminal or paradoxical figures is that of the “evental site” 
(BE, 173-77). Like the “situation” or counted multiples, the evental site is a place or 
site of presentation (knowledge), yet, unlike the situation, it contains no presentable 
or countable elements, since it sits at the “edge of the void” from which such 
elements must be called into presentation and existence. It thus consists of 
unpresentable singularities that have escaped the “count” or mechanism of thought 
(BE, 174-75). Like Heidegger, Badiou identifies the event with “history”, here 
understood not as temporal events but as the passage from a-temporality into time; a 
passage that erases all memory of a-temporality, thus echoing Heidegger’s condition 
of “thrownness”. Here acknowledging his debt to Heidegger, Badiou opposes 
“history” or the “historical situation” to “nature” or the “natural situation”, thereby 
identifying the “evental site” with a thinking of the “non-natural” (BE, 173-74). 
Nature is understood as the stable unfolding of presentational multiples (sets) in 
accordance with a calculus, while Heideggerian “history” is construed as the 
“unstable” or “anomalous” place in which unpresentable singularities are called from 
the void. This means that “A historical situation is therefore, in at least one of its 
points, on the edge of the void” (BE, 177). 
Despite their anomalous character, however, the evental sites can themselves be 
classified since, according to Badiou, there are just four of them. These are “love, art, 
science, and politics”, each understood as a place where the unthought can be thought 
and drawn across the threshold of presentation via an event (BE, 17). Love, art, 
science, and politics are thus construed as evental sites or historical situations where 
the natural situation can be radically transformed by a thinking of the unthinkable that 
“touches the void”, bringing forth new beings. Given this characterization, religion 
might be regarded as both a symptomatic absence and a founding presence for the 
four privileged points of contact with Being. For its part, as the domain of stable 
thought or presentation, nature is tantamount to a “forgetting of Being”: “Nature, 
structural stability, equilibrium of presentation and representation, is rather that from 
which being-there weaves the greatest oblivion” (177). It is thus no accident that 
Badiou’s term for “being-there” in this comment, l’être-là, is a common French 
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translation for Heidegger’s Dasein, since it is the fate of human Dasein to bring Being 
into time — to make it “being-there” — at the cost of forgetting it.31 
Badiou engineers access to the event by stationing it at the nexus of a specific 
contradiction or paradox, the mastery of which must be understood as a particular 
task and art of thought presented to the reader. He thus declares that in order to escape 
absorption within the stable and law-governed multiplicities of the natural situation, 
which would amount to a catastrophic presentation of the void, the event must arise 
from the unpresentable and unnamable singularities of the void itself. Conversely, if it 
is to fulfill its vocation of revolutionizing the domain of natural facts, then the event 
must itself be named and presented in the “situation”, as the condition of it crossing 
from the void into the domain of presentable things and beings: “By the declaration of 
the belonging of the event to the situation [naming] bars the void’s irruption. But this 
is only to force the situation itself to confess its own void, and to thereby let forth, 
from inconsistent being and the interrupted count, the incandescent non-being of an 
existence” (BE, 183). To read the central parts of Being and Event means in effect to 
practice the inner exercise or gymnastic of holding these contradictory stipulations in 
a kind of intellectual oscillation or equilibrium. This exercise is misunderstood by 
Badiou’s followers no less than his detractors, since the former imagine that it opens 
them to something outside themselves — the “event” — while the latter dismiss the 
structuring paradoxes as “fashionable nonsense”, with both sides forgetting that such 
exercises belong to a history of self-enclosed spiritual exercises.32 
Badiou repeats this exercise in a series of carefully structured paradoxes that 
traverse his favoured evental sites: “the working class, or a given state of artistic 
tendencies, or a scientific impasse” (BE, 179). The historical situation of 
revolutionary France thus consists of a multiple of contingencies existing in a kind of 
pre-revolutionary void and giving rise to no necessary revolutionary event. What 
transforms this situation into an evental site is the appearance of the name “French 
Revolution” among the elements that make up the site, and its use by the participants 
                                                
31  See, Alain Badiou, L'être et l'événement (Paris, 1988), p. 197.  
32  In this regard, Badiou’s text stands in a long tradition of Western Christian spiritual 
pedagogy, where aporiae are used as exercises in conceptual purification designed to allow 
the thinking of God using “human” predicates that have been suspended by paradox. For a 
germane account of the neoplatonic use of Plato’s Parmenides in this kind of aporetic 
spiritual pedagogy, see Alain Lernould, “Negative Theology and Radical Conceptual 
Purification in the Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Parmenides”, in Plato's Parmenides 
and Its Heritage, ed. J. D. Turner and K. Corrigan (Atlanta, 2010), pp. 257-74.  
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(or later commentators) to name the event. Badiou declares that this naming 
transforms the situation into an evental site by refracting it through the singularity of 
its qualification as an event (BE, 180). Emerging among the elements of an 
anonymous or unnamed multiple on the “edge of the void”, the name of the event is 
the key to the constitution of the evental site through which it will pass into the 
historical situation. This means that in order to fulfill its task the event must name 
itself, must be a “presentation of presentation”: “The event is thus clearly the multiple 
which both presents its entire site, and, by means of the pure signifier of itself 
immanent to its own multiple, manages to present the presentation itself, that is, the 
one of the infinite multiple that it is” (BE, 180). 
Badiou thus stations the event at the nexus of a paradox, in regards to which he 
comments quite appropriately: “I touch here upon the bedrock of my entire edifice” 
(BE, 181). If the event is part of the historical situation then it has already been 
severed from the unpresentable and unnamable force of the void and rendered 
nameable and thinkable within the normal situation, thereby losing its transformative 
potential. If it is not part of the situation, however, then the event remains among the 
anonymous elements of the void, its name signifying “nothing”, thence failing to 
constitute an evental site or transformative historical situation (BE, 182). By 
formulating this paradox, Badiou can declare the question of whether the event 
belongs to the situation to be “undecidable”: “The undecidablility of the event’s 
belonging to the situation can be interpreted as a double function. On the one hand, 
the event would evoke the void, on the other hand, it would interpose itself between 
the void and itself. It would be both a name of the void, and the ultra-one of the 
presentative structure” (BE, 182-83). 
This undecidability can only be resolved by the notion of a self-naming event 
that reveals the void within the situation. It thus sets the scene for the second of 
Badiou’s paradoxical thought-figures, that of the “intervention”. After declaring the 
question of whether the event belongs to the situation to be undecidable, and insisting 
that there is no decision-procedure to resolve the paradox, Badiou introduces the 
figure of the intervention as the path to a decision (BE, 202). The intervention has two 
elements: first, the declaration that there is indeed an “evental multiple”, or a multiple 
consisting of the elements of the evental site and the event itself; and second, the 
decision that the evental multiple is a term or name of the overarching historical 
situation to which it belongs. In fact, though, the crucial feature of the intervention is 
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that it names or interprets the event in the midst of its anonymous multiple and, in so 
doing, brings both the event and the historical situation into existence. To see this one 
must grasp the extraordinary or paradoxical character of the interventional naming of 
the event itself. On the one hand, the event cannot be named by first identifying it 
among the elements of the evental site, since it is the naming of the event that 
constitutes the site or historical situation. In Badiou’s example, the naming of the 
French Revolution gives birth to “that historical situation that we call France” (BE, 
203). On the other hand, this naming is supposedly itself impelled by something 
unconscious or unpresented within the evental site which, as it were, calls for its 
naming or thinking, such that “an intervention is to make a name out of an 
unpresented element of the site to qualify the event whose site is the site” (BE, 204). 
In other words, in a circularity or paradox that anticipates Badiou’s conception of 
the subject, if it is the interventional naming that “touches the void” and draws the 
unpresented element across the threshold of history by baptizing the event, then, at 
the same time, it is the event that “founds the possibility of intervention”, since there 
can be no naming without the aleatory or unconscious intrusion of the void into the 
ordered space of presentation (BE, 209). The “undecidable” question of whether the 
event belongs to the situation is thus repeated within the paradoxical figure of the 
intervention that was meant to decide it: the event is created by the interventional 
naming that calls it into historical existence, and yet it is the unconscious event that 
calls this interventional naming into existence so that it can cross from the void into 
thought and history. With this circularity we are fully on the terrain of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic circle, and it is striking that like Heidegger Badiou declares that it cannot 
be escaped, only “split” and then repeated: “There is actually no other recourse 
against this circle than that of splitting the point at which it rejoins itself” (BE, 209). 
Given that intervention cannot found the event that founds it, then Badiou can only 
declare that “the possibility of intervention must be assigned to the consequences of 
another event” (BE, 209). And this in turn allows him to reconfigure intervention as 
“fidelity” or the intervenor’s “faithfulness” to a prior event (BE, 211). But this of 
course only reinstates the circularity at one remove, for this prior event will also be 
one that is called into existence by the intervention that it calls forth. 
At this point, in a remarkable swerve in his supposedly atheistic discourse, 
Badiou attempts to stem the unending recursion of events and interventions by 
positing an arche-event. This turns out to be the advent of Christ, understood as the 
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founding instance of the event, and as the means of explicating the recurrence of 
events and the nature of intervention and fidelity. The symptomatic absence of 
religion from Badiou’s four points of contact with Being thus inverts into a founding 
presence. If up until this point it has been set-theoretical mathematics that has 
supplied Badiou with his symbology for Heideggerian metaphysics, then suddenly it 
is Christianity that offers him a central emblem of the event, but, in doing so, reminds 
us of the displaced theological character of his entire metaphysics of “touching the 
void”. Here, though, a decidedly sectarian undercurrent breaks through the surface of 
Badiou’s formalistic discourse, initially in a fond remembrance of his master Lacan’s 
bon mot that even if no religion were true, Christianity nonetheless “came closest to 
the question of truth” (BE, 212). Badiou interprets this to mean that in Christ 
Christianity supplied the founding emblem of the “ultra-one” or event whose 
emergence from the void imbued history and the cosmos with meaning. At the same 
time, though, repeating his fundamental paradox, Badiou also declares that the advent 
of Christ depended on the intervention of the apostles, whose naming of the “Christ-
event” called it into historical existence.33 
In a demeaning but quite traditional Christian trope, Badiou identifies Judaism 
with the “law” and the “normal situation”, declaring that the Jewish prophecies of a 
messiah had to be overturned by the apostolic naming of the tortured man as God, 
thereby enacting the “miracle” that calls forth the event, even as event calls for its 
apostolic naming (BE, 213, 216). It is thus the “fidelity” of an interventionist “avant-
garde” that resolves the undecidability of the question of whether the event belongs to 
the situation — here, whether Jesus is God — through an act of naming that is 
simultaneously an act of faith: “The belief of the intervening avant-garde bears on the 
eventness of the event, and it decides the event’s belonging to the situation. ‘Miracle’ 
names this belief, and so this decision. In particular, the life and death of Christ — the 
event strictly speaking — cannot be legitimated by the accomplishment of 
prophecies, otherwise the event would not interrupt the law” (BE, 219). Perhaps this 
anti-Judaism reflects Badiou’s Christian existentialist formation and lends some 
                                                
33  This is the paradox that structures Badiou’s meditation on the apostle Paul. See Alain 
Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundations of Universalism, trans. R. Brassier (Stanford CA, 2003), 
where we find such pronouncements as: “For Paul, it is a matter of investigating which law is 
capable of stucturing a subject devoid of all identity and suspended to an event whose only 
‘proof’ lies precisely in its having been declared by a subject” (p. 5). 
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plausibility to the claim that “Badiou can also be read as the last great author in the 
French tradition of Catholic dogmaticists that began with Pascal and Malebranche”.34 
Badiou’s final meditation in the sequence dealing with the event and the subject 
is one that explicates the theme of “fidelity” and with it his conception of the subject. 
Fidelity is the term that Badiou uses to characterize the relation between the naming 
of the event by the interveners and the transformation of the situation — the existing 
intellectual, factual, or institutional situation — that results from the intervention: “I 
call fidelity the set of procedures which discern, within a situation, those multiples 
whose existence depends upon the introduction into circulation (under the 
supernumerary name conferred by an intervention) of an evental multiple” (BE, 232). 
The paradoxical character of Badiou’s fidelity is that it combines both “discernment” 
of the multiples that constitute a situation and “love” of the event that has emerged 
from the void, in what Badiou for the first time characterizes as an “encounter” and 
designates as the “dialectic of being and event” (BE, 232). Badiou notes that “at the 
empirical level” there are competing fidelities to an event, as can be seen with 
Stalinists and Trotskyites in relation to the revolution, intensionalists and 
extensionalists in relation to set theory, and (twelve-tone) serialists and neo-classicists 
in relation to musical innovation (BE, 234); although it should be noted that for 
Badiou there is only one “true” fidelity in each of these cases. As one might expect, 
however, Badiou only entertains two possible “fidelity procedures”: one, “dogmatic”, 
that allows the “evental multiples” to be absorbed within the factual situation whose 
law-governed character Badiou identifies with the “state”; and another, “generic”, 
that remains true to the incalculable fecundity of the event itself, injecting the 
situation with an uncountable infinity of multiples, and operating as an “inexistent 
procedure” adjacent to pure chance (BE, 235-36).  
I shall return to this last issue below. For the moment, though, our attention is 
focused on Badiou’s posing of the question of whether the interventionist naming of 
the event — or the “encounter” with it at the edge of the void — prescribes a 
particular form of fidelity as the mode of its unfolding in the worldly situation. 
Despite characterizing this as “one of the most profound questions of philosophy”, it 
should be clear that Badiou has already pre-empted its answer, since it is only a 
particular form of fidelity — for example, Paul’s fidelity to Christ as God — that 
                                                
34  Slavoj Zizek, “Psychoanalysis in Post-Marxism: The Case of Alain Badiou”, The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 97 (1998): 235-61, at 244.  
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permits an inexistent event to make the transition into worldly existence (BE, 238). 
Nonetheless, Badiou’s way of formulating this question is full of interest, and allows 
us to draw together the threads of our commentary on the theme of “spiritual 
exercises”. Badiou’s comment is thus: 
Philosophically speaking, the ‘topos’ of this question is that of Wisdom, 
or Ethics, in their relation to a central illumination obtained without a 
concept at the end of an initiatory groundwork, whatever the means may 
be (the Platonic ascension, Cartesian doubt, the Husserlian εποχη 
[epoché] …). It is always a matter of knowing whether one can deduce, 
from the evental conversion, the rules of the infinite fidelity. (BE, 238-39) 
This is the first and only explicit reference to conversion in Being and Event, but it 
provides incipient clarification of the relation between the event and the subject. It is 
also the immediate context for Badiou’s stipulative definition of the subject: “I will 
call subject the process itself of liaison between the event (thus the intervention) and 
the procedure of fidelity (thus its operator of connection)” (BE, 239). 
This comment provides the opportunity for a significant retrospective 
clarification of Badiou’s Heideggerian discourse on the event and the subject. After 
all, if we isolate Badiou’s central paradox — the naming of the event is the calling of 
an unthought thing into existence by a subject who is simultaneously called into 
existence by the event — then how might this be understood other than as a “central 
illumination obtained without a concept at the end of an initiatory groundwork”? In 
other words, positioned as something that can only be acceded to via the exercises in 
paradox that we have just discussed, Badiou’s event can be understood as the telos of 
a particular spiritual exercise that his readers must perform on themselves. Through 
the arduous inner exercise of maintaining both sides of the Heideggerian paradox, 
Badiou’s faithful readers are to be rewarded by something far more profound than 
knowledge of a philosophical doctrine: namely, by the transformation of their 
quotidian selves into a rare subject who is spiritually qualified to receive the 
illumination of the truth as event (BE, 432-33).  
To behold Badiou’s event, even theoretically, is thus to undergo a conversion. If 
so, then Being and Event should be understood in significant part as a conversion 
discourse, which helps to explain the affective intensity imbuing its paradoxical 
central figures of thought. This clarifies Badiou’s insistence that not all individuals 
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are subjects (BE, 285). In fact on his account only those individuals who have been 
renovated or converted by their encounter with a transformative event — that is, only 
those individuals who have passed through the paradoxes of Badiou’s Heideggerian 
exercises — can obtain the “militant” or “avant-garde” fidelity to the event’s infinite 
unfolding that qualifies them as subjects. Badiou’s use of set theory as a symbology 
for Heideggerian metaphysics thus stations his discourse at the nexus of “philosophy” 
and “spirituality”.35 For this discourse is one that makes access to the objects of 
philosophical knowledge — the void and the transfinite, the event and the subject — 
conditional on performance of the Heideggerian conversion-paradoxes that spiritually 
qualify the subject to accede to “truth”. It is this nexus that makes Badiou’s discourse 
— for all its extolling of the aleatory, the unpresentable, the infinite, and the 
incalculable — so profoundly closed and sectarian, and so radically dependent on the 
making of converts and disciples. 
Discerning the Indiscernible (from Having Knowledge to Being-in-Truth) 
In the culminating stage of Being and Event Badiou purports to provide, for the 
first time in history, a formal mathematical demonstration of how the unpresentable 
or “indiscernible” — that emerges from the void and inhabits the transfinite gaps 
within nature — is brought across the threshold of discernment. This is to occur 
through a mathematical simulacrum of the “fidelity procedure” that mediates the 
subject’s summoning of the event and the event’s summoning of the subject. For 
Badiou the discerning of the indiscernible is not “knowledge”, understood as the 
generation of multiples or sets from mathematical axioms and functions, for in this 
sense Being is never known. Rather it is “truth”, understood as something disclosed to 
the subject through the subject’s own coming into being in the interventional naming 
of the event: “The operator of faithful connection designates another mode of 
discernment: one which, outside knowledge but within the effect of an interventional 
nomination, explores connections to the supernumerary name of the event” (BE, 329). 
Discerning the indiscernible multiples of the void is thus not an act of knowledge 
                                                
35  Here I am drawing on Foucault’s distinction between “philosophy” as the “form of 
thought that asks … what determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood”, and 
“spirituality” as the “search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out 
the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth”, including 
“purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of 
existence, etc.”. See Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the 
College de France 1981-1982 ed. F. Gros, trans. G. Burchell (New York, 2006), p. 15.  
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attending the mastery of a calculus or grammar. It is an act of spiritual self-
transformation in which the subject is called forth to enter the truth of Being that it 
has called forth. 
This is a remarkably ambitious undertaking. Were it to succeed then Badiou 
would have transformed what remains a kind of philosophical mythography in 
Heidegger — the figure of Being’s disclosure through the calling into existence of 
human being in whom it remains concealed — into a quasi-mathematical 
demonstration, thereby putting Heideggerian philosophy onto an entirely new basis, 
or perhaps superseding it. The formal-mathematical technique that he chooses to 
instantiate and execute the “fidelity procedure” or “operator of faithful connection” is 
thus crucial to Badiou’s entire undertaking. It is important to observe that for Badiou 
this technique is not a symbol or allegory for the Heideggerian thought-figure. 
Instead, he regards it as the actual form in which the subject comes to unconsciously 
discern the indiscernible Being that has emerged from the void through the event and 
entered the transfinite spaces of the real number line or “continuum”. The 
mathematical procedure that Badiou asks to bear this extraordinary metaphysical 
weight is the advanced set-theoretic and model-theoretic technique known as 
“forcing”. 
Forcing was invented around 1963 by the American mathematician Paul Cohen. 
It is a technique for constructing a certain kind of model for the standard axiomatized 
form of set theory, known as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice 
(ZFC).36 A model for set theory is simply a class of sets engineered in such a way as 
to “satisfy” its axioms and theorems. A model is thus a “universe” of abstract 
mathematical objects in relation to which a set-theoretic theorem can be shown to be 
inconsistent or consistent with ZFC, depending on whether or not its negation is 
satisfied by the model. Equally, a model for ZFC might show that a theorem and its 
                                                
36  As a non-mathematician I have drawn the following account of forcing from several 
standard sources, which are listed here for other non-mathematicians in order of increasing 
technicality, beginning with some generally accessible accounts: Thomas Jech, “What is 
Forcing?”, Notices of the American Mathematical Society 55 (2008): 692-93; Paul Cohen, 
“The Discovery of Forcing”, Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathematics 32 (2002): 1071-100; 
Timothy Y. Chow, “A Beginner's Guide to Forcing”, in Contemporary Mathematics: 
Communicating Mathematics, ed. T. Y. Chow and D. C. Isaksen (Providence, Rhode Island, 
2009), pp. 25-40; Thomas Jech, Set Theory, 3rd rev. ed. (Berlin, 2003), pp. 201-24; and Paul J. 
Cohen, Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis (New York, 1966), pp. 107-29. 
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negation are both satisfied by the model, meaning that the theorem is undecidable or 
“independent” of ZFC. 
The theorem whose undecidability Cohen sought to demonstrate, by showing 
that its negation was satisfied by a particular model of ZFC, was Cantor’s “continuum 
hypothesis”, which we have already encountered in our discussion of transfinite 
numbers. Cantor’s hypothesis is grounded in his conception of numbers as classes of 
sets, thence in his conception of the “natural numbers” or integers as forming a 
“countable infinite set” — the number of elements in this set forming its “cardinality” 
and being symbolized by the cardinal number ℵ0 (aleph-nought). This gives rise to 
Cantor’s hypothesis that the first “uncountably infinite number”, ℵ1 (aleph-1) is 2N0 
(2 to the power aleph-nought), which he equated with the continuum or set of 
asymptotic “real” numbers as discussed above.37 2N0 is the cardinality of the set of all 
subsets (the “power set”) of ℵ0, or the cardinality of the (countably) infinite set of 
natural numbers.38 As an algebraic combinatory of the elements of the set of natural 
numbers, the power set of aleph-nought, 2N0, has a hyper-large cardinality, incapable 
of being counted by (put into a one-to-one relation with) the natural numbers.39 
Cantor’s hypothesis is thus that the cardinality of the continuum (or set of real 
numbers) is 2N0 = ℵ1, the first uncountably infinite cardinal in what was envisaged as 
a series of such cardinals, each formed by the performance of the power-set 
permutation on its predecessor. In 1937 the German mathematician Kurt Gödel had 
constructed a set model that showed that the continuum theorem is consistent with 
ZF. Cohen’s endeavour in 1963 was to construct a set model showing that the 
negation of the theorem is also consistent with ZF(C), thereby demonstrating its 
                                                
37  Joseph W. Dauben, Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite 
(Princeton NJ., 1979), pp. 96-101. 
38  The power set is an algebraic invention that works by taking the countable elements 
of a set and then creating new groups of numbers (“subsets”) based on all possible algebraic 
permutations of the original elements. The number of permutations or subsets formed in this 
way is two the the power of the number of the original elements. An original set of three 
elements thus gives rise to a power set of 23, or 8 subsets. If the original set is the infinite 
(unending) number of natural numbers ℵ0, then the power set of the natural numbers, 2N0  or 
ℵ1, is the imagined result of an infinitude of permutations that are incapable of being 
performed. Here I set aside the question of whether a power set is a “set” in the same sense as 
the original set of elements — since it is formed through a different calculus — and hence the 
question of whether its number should be regarded as “larger” than that of the original set, as 
opposed to being counted (permuted) in a different way. 
39  Cohen, “Discovery”: 1079. 
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undecidability or independence. Forcing is the technique that he developed in order to 
construct this new set model. 
For our present limited purposes, forcing may be understood as a procedure for 
transforming Gödel’s “standard model” M of ZFC by adjoining a further set, G, 
giving rise to the extended set model M[G] in which the continuum hypothesis fails. 
Gödel had shown that the standard model for ZFC constituted an exhaustive minimal 
model, that is, a “constructible universe” of sets built-up exhaustively from simpler 
sets, and that satisfied the continuum theorem.40 This meant that to adjoin the new set 
G to the standard model M Cohen had to invent new formulas, his “forcing 
conditions”, which are formulas (sometimes called “names”) providing information 
regarding membership of G. Meanwhile, G is understood as a “generic” set, meaning 
that it decides the truth and compatibility of the forcing conditions, but without 
sharing any formula or “property” of the standard model M.41 
Taking G as a set of integers, Jech provides a simplified example of how G is 
built from forcing conditions: “As forcing conditions we consider finite sets of 
expressions a ∈ G and a ∉ G [a is in G, a is not in G] where a ranges over the set of 
all integers. (Therefore {1 ∈ G, 2 ∉ G, 3 ∈ G, 4 ∈ G} is a condition that forces G ∩ 
{1, 2, 3, 4} = {1, 3, 4})”.42 Here “forces” should be understood as analogous to 
“implies”, since it refers to the outcome of a special kind of equation. In this way G is 
built by using the same primitive notions of set and membership that determine the 
standard model M, while augmenting it in a such way that the extended model M[G] 
continues to satisfy ZFC. Once this was done, Cohen could use forcing conditions to 
adjoin integers to M[G] that violated the continuum hypothesis, arranging, for 
example, that M[G] contain ℵ2 elements, and declaring this to be the cardinality of 
the continuum rather than ℵ1.43 
Odd though it will seem to mathematicians, Badiou’s key strategy is to treat 
Cohen’s forcing technique as his central instance of the “fidelity procedure” that 
names the event and permits the “unpresentable” elements of the void to cross the 
threshold of thought and existence. In order to put forcing to work in this 
                                                
40  Kurt Gödel, "The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and the Generalized 
Continuum-Hypothesis", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 24 (1938): 556-57.  
41  Cohen, “Discovery”: 1091. 
42  Jech, “Forcing”: 693. 
43  Cohen, “Discovery”: 1097. 
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metaphysical register, Badiou identifies the standard model (M) of ZFC — the 
“situation” in Badiou’s lexicon — with “discernment” or “knowledge”, which is in 
turn understood as the universe of constructible sets, excluding the random and 
aleatory, and hence the event (BE, 337). At the same time, he identifies the adjoined 
“generic” set G with the unpresentable or “indiscernible” and thence with “truth”. In 
fact Badiou equates the indiscernible with the multiple infinities that supposedly 
inhabit the situation (or standard model), supposedly without being discerned there, 
yet capable of manifesting themselves in the truth of the subject’s blind encounter 
with the event: “The discernible is veridical. But the indiscernible alone is true. There 
is no truth apart from the generic, because only a faithful procedure aims at the one of 
situational being. A faithful procedure has as its infinite horizon being-in-truth” (BE, 
339). 
Badiou’s central idea is thus that Cohen’s forcing technique is a means of 
naming the event, thereby discerning the indiscernible truth within the merely 
veridical “situation” itself. He interprets this in quasi-apocalyptic terms, as the first 
time in the history of humanity that unnamable being has been “de jure” or formally 
rendered immanent to discernment: 
However, [the truth] would remain subtracted from knowledge if the 
language of the situation was not radically transformed. Not only is a 
truth indiscernible, but its procedure requires that this indiscernibility be. 
A truth would force the situation to dispose itself such that this truth … be 
finally recognized as a term, and as internal. A faithful generic procedure 
renders the indiscernible immanent. (BE, 342) 
Without Cohen realizing it, his procedure is thus supposed to be world-changing, 
since like the parallel fidelity procedures in art, science, and politics it permits the 
naming of unnamable being: “As such, art, science and politics do change the world, 
not by what they discern, but by what they indiscern therein. And the all-powerfulness 
of a truth is merely that of changing what is, such that this unnamable being may be, 
which is the very being of what-is” (BE, 343). 
It should be clear already that despite his technical command of it, Badiou’s 
deployment of forcing has little in common with Cohen’s, or indeed with the kinds of 
set theory and model theory on which Cohen was drawing. We have already observed 
that the putative ontological origin of sets is not a topic within set theory, since sets 
are treated as abstract objects manipulated through the syntactic rules of set theory, 
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and justified solely in terms of the richness of the mathematical results. Further, 
models of set theory, whether the “standard model” M or the “generic” extension G, 
have no necessary ontological implications; that is, they are not equated with 
discernible beings or indiscernible Being. This is not least because ZFC set theory can 
be (and has been) supplied with a plurality of models, depending on particular model-
theoretic objectives, as we saw with Cohen’s construction of M[G] in order to show 
the undecidability of Cantor’s continuum theorem.44 Above all, though, it is alien to 
Cohen’s entire way of proceeding that the forcing conditions used to build the new 
generic set G might be regarded as the discerning of a set that was somehow already 
present in the standard model M but invisibly so.45 This is because the forcing 
conditions or formulas are not part of M but are added to it as the means of generating 
the set of integers that will be in G. 
Here the important thing to observe is that rather than being an indiscernible set 
within the model or “situation” M, G does not exist in M. Indeed, Cohen’s forcing 
conditions — n in G, n not in G, etc. — are explicitly designed to produce a “new” set 
that is not already contained in M, as the condition of ensuring the failure of the 
continuum hypothesis in M[G].46 The forcing conditions for G are thus not a special 
way of discerning (“indiscerning”) something that was indiscernible in M — the 
event, unnamable being. They are ordinary formulas adjoined to M and that function 
as the means of adding the set G to form the augmented model M[G]. In other words, 
in treating it as a “fidelity procedure” that discerns the indiscernible in the standard 
situation by naming the event, Badiou is deploying Cohen’s forcing technique as an 
allegory for the Heideggerian theme of the naming of unnamable Being, while 
simultaneously improvising a formal symbolization for this theme. Badiou thus 
invents an allegorical mathematical symbolism for Heideggerian metaphysics by 
renaming the generic set G as the “indiscernible set”, then providing it with a new 
(Lacanian) symbol ♀ — symbolizing woman as a being beyond “phallic” knowledge. 
                                                
44  For a helpful discussion of how pluralism in model-building precludes an ontological 
interpretation of set theory, see Penelope Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics (Oxford, 2000), 
pp. 22-37.  
45  Conversely, many of Badiou’s commentators simply presume that Cohen’s forcing 
conditions are a means of discerning a generic set that is supposely indiscernibly present in 
the “situation” or the ground model (M) of ZFC, although they rarely cite Cohen to this effect, 
only Badiou. See, for examples, Hallward, Badiou, pp. 135-39; and Sean Bowden, “The Set-
Theoretical Nature of Badiou's Ontology and Lautman's Dialectic of Problematic Ideas”, in 
Badiou and Philosophy, ed. S. Bowden and S. Duffy (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. at 53-5.  
46  Cohen, “Discovery”: 1095-96. 
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This permits him to substitute S(♀) (the situation containing the indiscernible set) for 
Cohen’s M[G] (the standard model augmented through the forcing of the generic set). 
Here we can see the attempt to create a Heideggerian symbolism, not as a notation for 
the performance of set-theoretic calculations or model-theoretic constructions, but as 
an esoteric symbolism for the Heideggerian recovery the unknowable through a 
naming that incarnates it in a subject who embodies its truth. 
In treating the generic set as indiscernibly present in the standard model M, or 
basic “situation” S, however, Badiou creates a formidable technical problem for his 
discourse. If the generic set is to be construed as indiscernible within the standard 
model or situation, then the formulas or functions that “discern” the membership of 
the set (Cohen’s forcing conditions) must themselves be present in the original model 
or situation. For if these conditions of discernment are not present, then the state of 
affairs is not one in which the generic set cannot be seen — i.e., is “indiscernible” — 
but one in which it cannot be looked for, since there are no criteria determining what 
it would mean to find it. If the conditions are present in the initial model or situation, 
however, then the generic set is discernible there in the normal way. This difficulty 
can be formulated as a dilemma. Either the formulas (forcing conditions, “names”) 
that determine membership of the generic set G are present in the standard model M 
(the situation S), in which case G is already discernible in M and cannot function as a 
symbol for the naming of “unnamable being”. Or these formulas are not present in the 
standard model but are added to it in the form of forcing conditions that select the 
membership of G. But in this case it is not that G cannot be seen (is indiscernible) in 
the standard model or situation but that it cannot be looked for there, while of course 
being unproblematically discernible in the new or augmented model M[G]. No such 
dilemma arises for Cohen, as it does not cross his mind to treat G as indiscernibly 
present in the ground model M — he is not a Heideggerian philosopher in search of 
symbol for the naming of unnamable being — and he simply treats the forcing 
conditions as additions to M that “discern” G (select its members) for the purposes of 
the new or augmented model M[G].  
As it turns out, Badiou is explicitly aware of this dilemma confronting his project 
(BE, 375). He is not in a position to resolve it by following Cohen’s path, however, 
for that would preclude him from treating forcing as a discerning of the indiscernible, 
which would in turn undo his entire attempt to formalize the Heideggerian 
philosopheme of naming the unnamable. Badiou thus adopts a different strategy. He 
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treats the conditions or formulas for discerning G as latently or unconsciously present 
in the standard model or situation, allowing G to be thought of as indiscernibly or 
unconsciously present there too: 
We will thus start from a multiple [set] supposed existent in the initial 
situation (the quasi-complete situation); that is, from a multiple which 
belongs to this situation. … This multiple will be both the basic material 
for the construction of the indiscernible (whose elements will be extracted 
from it), and the place of its intelligibility (because the conditions which 
the indiscernible must obey in order to be indiscernible will be 
materialized by certain structures of the chosen multiple). (BE, 357) 
This allows Badiou to treat the addition of the forcing conditions as realizing a latent 
or unconscious element in the ground model, and thence the building of G as a 
discerning of the indiscernible. Clearly this represents a major departure from Cohen 
for whom the forcing conditions for G are not latently present in the initial situation or 
standard model but are a new piece of mathematical syntax whose role is not to 
discern something indiscernible in the situation but to adjoin a new set. 
Badiou’s strategy is exceedingly convoluted — few of his readers will have been 
able to follow it — but can be reduced for expositional purposes to two basic moves. 
In the first move, he does something that has no analogue in set theory or model 
theory but that accords with the French tradition of treating formal languages as 
embedded in (or as) a philosophical subject: he treats the ground model M (the “initial 
situation” S) and the augmented model M[G] (or S(♀)) as if they were worlds 
inhabited by different epistemological subjects. Badiou thus designates the first of 
these subjects as the “inhabitant of the situation S”, and he characterizes this subject 
(sometimes the “working mathematician”) as viewing the relation between the set-
theoretic axioms and the situation or standard model from the “inside”; that is, from 
within the model-theoretic formulas that construct a model (M) that satisfies the 
axioms and theorems of ZFC (BE, 358-62). He then designates the subject of the 
augmented model M[G] (or S(♀)) as the “ontologist”, and he ascribes this subject a 
capacity for viewing the relation between the first inhabitant and the ground model 
from the “outside”. This is a perspective that is supposed to permit the ontologist to 
“see” the indiscernible set that purportedly remains invisible to the inhabitant of the 
standard model (BE, 372-75). Badiou later concedes that the notion of an 
epistemological inhabitant of a mathematical model is actually a “metaphor” that 
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would not be accepted by mathematicians: “Note that ‘inhabitant of S’ is a metaphor, 
which does not correspond to any mathematical concept” (BE, 411). But this is not 
before he has used this metaphor to convert the absence of forcing conditions in the 
ground model (indicating G cannot be looked for) into the unconscious limits of a 
certain kind of epistemological subjectivity (indicating G cannot be seen). This in turn 
allows the “ontologist” to be presented as discerning something that is indiscernible 
or unconscious for the “inhabitant” of the standard model or situation, rather than as 
someone (like Cohen) who invents a new syntax or calculus and with it new 
mathematical entities. 
Mathematicians and mathematical logicians, however, do not regard the models 
of set theory as worlds inhabited by subjects who might have limited or unlimited 
epistemological access to them. They treat them instead as sets or classes of sets that 
are constructed by mathematicians for the technical purposes of demonstrating the 
(in)consistency of particular axioms or theorems. Viewed in this way, rather than 
being an epistemological theory of mathematical truths that are confirmed by the 
models, set theory is in fact a way of performing mathematical operations in a more 
abstract and generalized notation.47 In Wittgenstein’s pithier formulation, the only 
way of knowing mathematical objects is by doing mathematics, or inventing it, which 
means that “one cannot discover any connection between the parts of mathematics or 
logic that was already there without one knowing”.48 Cohen’s forcing conditions were 
a mathematical invention. Badiou’s introduction of the metaphorical epistemological 
inhabitant of a model is thus a way of smuggling the criteria or forcing conditions for 
the generic set G into the standard model M (or situation S) by treating them as 
unconsciously present in the subject or “inhabitant of the initial situation”. This 
allows the absence of the forcing conditions in Gödel’s M (the fact that they had not 
then been invented) to be illicitly treated as their unconscious presence in a mythical 
subject of M — as the “indiscernment” of “unnamable being”. Badiou can thus 
portray Cohen’s invention of the forcing formulas as if it were the “ontologist’s” 
discernment of an indiscernible generic set already present in M or the “initial 
situation”.  
The second wing of Badiou’s strategy is an even more arcane affair. It involves 
treating the “names” or formulas of the standard model M or “initial situation” S as 
                                                
47  Maddy, Naturalism, pp. 24-7. 
48  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar (Oxford, 1974), p. 481.  
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themselves harbouring the formulas or forcing statements that produce the generic set 
G (or indiscernible set ♀). This again allows Badiou to transmute Cohen’s invention 
of the forcing statements into a means of naming unnamable being, thus to treat 
forcing as a “fidelity procedure” that forces the situation to “accommodate” the 
indiscernible truth through the “intervention” of the subject (BE, 342). As we have 
noted, Badiou is himself aware of the dilemma that he must resolve for this strategy 
to succeed. If the formulas for constructing the generic set are already used in the 
standard model M (or initial situation S), then the generic set is already discerned 
within the initial situation, and forcing is no longer a naming of unnamable being. But 
if the formulas are added to the ground model for the purpose of producing a new 
model, as they are by Cohen, then the generic set is not something that was already 
present and indiscernible in the initial situation or ground model, but is simply 
something unintelligible there. Badiou thus comments that “The extreme difficulty of 
the question lies in this ‘addition’ having to be made with the resources of S: 
otherwise it would be unintelligible for an inhabitant of S” (BE, 375). This of course 
is not a problem for Cohen, as he does not require the generic set G to be present in 
the ground model or initial situation, or that it be intelligible but indiscernible for 
some “metaphorical” inhabitant. 
Badiou’s solution to the problem is thus also foreign to Cohen’s forcing 
procedure: “The solution to this problem consists in constructing, within the situation, 
multiples which function as names for every possible element of the situation 
obtained by the addition of the indiscernible ♀” (BE, 358). We can recall that 
Cohen’s “names” or forcing conditions are iterative formulas — similar to n in G, n 
not in G, etc. — added to the standard model (or situation) for the purpose of 
selecting the elements of the “adjoined” generic set G (Badiou’s ♀). Badiou’s 
solution, however, involves treating the forcing conditions or names as 
(simultaneously) already present in the standard model or situation where their role is 
not to adjoin a set to the basic model but to discern the indiscernible set or name the 
unnamable being supposedly unconsciously present there. In other words, in a crucial 
move, Badiou deals with what would be a destructive dilemma within model theory 
by transforming it into a philosophical paradox or spiritual exercise within 
Heideggerian metaphysics: 
The striking paradox of our undertaking is that we are going to try to 
name the very thing which is impossible to discern. We are searching for 
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a language for the unnamable. It will have to name the latter without 
naming it, it will instruct its vague existence without specifying anything 
whatsoever within it. The intra-ontological realization of this program, its 
sole resource the multiple, is a spectacular performance. (376) 
The are two main parts to this performance. Badiou’s first move is one that has 
no parallel in set theory or model theory: he treats the “multiples” or sets of the initial 
situation or standard model as already harbouring the generic set (and its forcing 
conditions) but in a “negative” or indiscernible form. The baroque details of this 
mathematico-metaphysical construction need not detain us. Suffice it to say that 
Badiou’s basic procedure is to treat the formulas of the standard model or initial 
situation as if they were chosen from among an indeterminate plenitude of formulas 
— proxy for the unpresentable multiples of the void — rather than being syntactic 
constructs ab initio as they are for Gödel and Cohen. The putatively “unchosen” 
formulas are then treated as the negative or indiscernible conditions of those 
supposedly chosen to form the sets of the standard model or situation (BE, 367-71). In 
a simulacrum of Heidegger’s “forgetting of being”, this allows the “discernment” of 
the sets of the initial situation or standard model to be treated as conditioned by the 
“indiscernment” of the generic or “indiscernible set ♀”. The indiscernible set can thus 
be regarded as unnameably present within the standard model or situation S as the 
condition of its discernment that has been hidden from or “forgotten” by the 
“inhabitant of S”, historically Gödel! 
In a more technical (but no less metaphysical) register, this allows Badiou to 
view the multiples (sets) or formulas of the initial situation or model as if they 
consisted of sets of conditions, among which may be the conditions for discerning or 
forcing the generic or “indiscernible” set (BE, 365-67). This is how Badiou engineers 
the sets of the initial situation (standard model M) such that they will supposedly 
already contain “information” regarding the indiscernible set, in the form of latent 
forcing conditions that give rise to the generic set. Finally, Badiou purports to solve 
the problem of which among the latent conditions supposedly present in the “base 
multiples” will be chosen to discern the generic set. He does this by presuming that 
the generic set has already been identified, which means that the “correct set” of 
forcing conditions is the one that “aims at” the generic set (BE, 365). In other words, 
he treats the generic set as a Heideggerian “projection”, and the forcing set as the 
“always already present” set of conditions of the projection. In Cohen’s construction, 
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however, the generic set G cannot be known in advance of the forcing conditions and 
then used to select the “correct” conditions from among those supposedly already 
present in the initial model or situation. Here the generic set is itself formed by 
forcing conditions (formulas) that have been added to the initial model as a new piece 
of mathematical syntax from which the generic set will be constructed as a new set.  
The second part of Badiou’s “spectacular performance” consists in his attempt to 
show how the “intelligibility” of the indiscernible (generic) set can be derived by 
“manipulating” the sets or formulas of the initial situation (standard model) itself, 
allowing the generic set to be thought of as present but indiscernible there rather than 
being generated as a new model. Once again I shall only be concerned with the major 
stops in Badiou’s labyrinthine and scarcely traceable itinerary. Badiou’s key move 
here is to treat the forcing conditions as already latently present in the “names” or sets 
(“basic multiples”) of the initial situation or ground model, as it were allowing the 
names to function as the point where the occluded negative or “forgotten” conditions 
can be made to surface or “materialize”. He does this simply by stipulating that the 
names of the basic multiples of the ground model will themselves consists of ordered 
pairs of names and conditions <u, π>, among the latter being the conditions of the 
generic or indiscernible set itself (BE, 376). This satisfies Badiou’s need for the 
forcing conditions to be present in the initial situation (so that the indiscernible set is 
intelligible), but to be latently or unconsciously present (so that the indiscernible set 
cannot be discerned by the inhabitant). He thus comments that “It is with these names 
that we are going to construct a situation S(♀) to which the indiscernible ♀ will 
belong. A case in which it is literally the name that creates the thing” (BE, 378). 
Badiou then specifies the manner in which the “names” of the initial situation S give 
rise to the generic or indiscernible set ♀ by introducing a binary function R♀. This 
“reference function” operates on the paired names and conditions <u, π>, such that 
the resulting “referential value” determines ♀ as a “referent” of the names that are 
supposedly “in S” (BE, 378-80). Badiou represents this as R♀(u) = <u, π>, which 
might one day be collected as rare curio in the history of formal languages: a one-off 
attempt to formulate a mythopoeic “equation” for symbolizing the Heideggerian 
discerning the indiscernible. 
By this point, however, the problems besetting Badiou’s construction — if 
conceived as formal model theory rather than as Heideggerian philosophy — are 
starting to cascade. We have already noted that Badiou’s embedding of the 
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indiscernible set within the ground model or initial situation — by treating the 
formulas of the latter as amnesic selections from the infinite multiples of the void — 
represents a Heideggerian intrusion into model theory. Now we can now observe that 
the introduction of the symbol ♀ — woman as impervious to “phallic knowledge” — 
represents the importation of a foreign “semantic” symbol into the formal-syntactic 
order of set theory and model theory. For if we consider it in a purely formal-
syntactic manner, then nothing about the operation of a binary function on the pairs of 
names and conditions <u, π> indicates that the resulting “referential value” R♀(u) will 
be the indiscernible set; nothing, that is, apart from the illicit semantic use of the ♀ 
symbol itself. If however we suspend the semantic meaning of ♀, and view Badiou’s 
generation of the generic set from the “names” in a purely formal-syntactic manner, 
then the dilemma haunting his account returns in full force. For, now, either the 
functional names are part of the standard model or initial situation, in which case their 
sets are generated or “discerned” unproblematically but do not constitute an 
indiscernible or generic set. Or the names are indeed Cohen’s forcing conditions that 
have been added to the ground model as a new piece of mathematical syntax. But this 
means that the “adjoined” generic set was not intelligible yet indiscernible in the 
ground model or initial situation, since the conditions permitting it to be “looked for” 
had not yet been added. 
We can conclude then that Badiou can interpret Cohen’s forcing procedure as a 
discerning of the indiscernible — and thus as an instance of the “fidelity procedure” 
that names the unnamable and changes the world — only through the deployment of 
three philosophemes that transform forcing into a Heideggerian allegory: first, 
Badiou’s introduction of the epistemological subject (“the inhabitant of S”) into 
model theory, permitting the absence of the conditions for “looking for” the generic 
set to be transmuted into the subject’s “unconscious” failure to see or discern it; 
second, his treatment of formulas “discerning” the standard model M or initial 
situation S as if they were selections from an infinity of amnesed formulas in the 
void, these remaining indiscernibly present as the latent conditions of discernment of 
the indiscernible or generic set; and third, his treatment of the forcing conditions as 
contained within the sets or “names” of the initial situation or ground model — rather 
than being added as a new piece of mathematical syntax — and thus able to function 
as a discerning of the indiscernible set ♀ and as the naming of unnamable being.  
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Situated in this hybrid metaphysical-mathematical discursive space, the twin 
subjects of Badiou’s allegory of forcing are locked into an unbreakable Heideggerian 
embrace. On the one hand, the “inhabitant of S” can discern his world only on the 
basis of formulas or names that conceal the unnamable infinite multiples from which 
they have been drawn and are buried in them. On the other hand, in naming the 
unnamable by the “aleatory” procedure of forcing in which the “name creates the 
thing”, the “ontologist” makes room for the event as the “being of truth”, but does so 
blindly, since his fidelity to the event brings this subject into existence: “What must 
be recognised therein, when it inexists in the first situation under the supernumerary 
sign ♀, is nothing less than the purely formal mark of the event whose being is 
without being; and when its existence is indiscerned in the second situation, is 
nothing less than the blind recognition, by ontology, of a possible being of truth” (BE, 
387). What this means of course is that the subject’s naming of the unnameable event 
creates the conditions for discerning the indiscernible ♀, while the aleatory encounter 
with the unnameable event creates the conditions or the subject in which the 
indiscernible will be discerned. In short, we end with the paradox of the subject 
whose naming summons the unnameable Being that summons the subject — the 
paradox mediated through the spiritual exercise of Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle — 
which is the point at which we began. 
Concluding Remarks 
In fact I began by proposing to offer a description of Badiou’s discourse as 
formed at the nexus of the allegorical deployment set theory as a symbology for 
Heideggerian metaphysics, and the transposition of this metaphysics into a kind of 
mythopoeic mathematical symbolism. In the course of this description we have 
encountered a recurrent dilemma. Here Badiou’s claim to treat set theory 
formalistically, as producing its objects from its “names” or formulas, encounters the 
contradictory claim that these names or formulas have the role of articulating objects 
that already exist but are indiscernible.49 Were Badiou’s discourse to be what he 
claims it is — a “metaontological” use of set theory and model theory proving the 
thesis that “mathematics is ontology” — then this dilemma would be destructive of 
his undertaking, for within those mathematical disciplines it can only point to an 
                                                
49  For the identification of a parallel dilemma between Badiou’s ontological and truth-
theoretic interpretations of set theory, see Fraser, “The Law of the Subject”, pp. 67-70. 
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insurmountable contradiction. I have shown though that Badiou’s discourse is not 
grounded in these disciplines but in the discipline of Heideggerian metaphysics, and 
that here the recurrent dilemma does not play-out as a contradiction. Rather, it is 
systematically transmuted into a paradox whose central form is that the act of 
mathematical naming of the “event”, by which the subject summons unpresentable 
Being into thought and existence, is simultaneously the moment in which the event 
summons the subject into existence as the being in which Being is disclosed and 
concealed.  
This paradox is the fundamental Heideggerian thought-figure that I have 
identified lying at the core of Badiou’s Being and Event and organising its basic 
discursive operations. In the course of our description however we have learned that 
this figure of thought is also a type of spiritual exercise. In fact it is an inner 
gymnastic required of Badiou’s readers so that they may pass beyond merely 
“veridical” knowledge and encounter the “truth” in its highest and most paradoxical 
form: as an encounter with unnamable Being that calls them into existence as its 
“subject”, even as their naming of Being calls it into existence in and as the world of 
beings. Those who have sought to mock Badiou’s discourse as “fashionable 
nonsense” could hardly be more mistaken or less effectual, since the staging of such 
spiritual exercises reaches all the way back to the “psychagogies” of the early 
Christian and neoPlatonic schools.50 What is modern about Badiou’s discourse is that 
it emerged as a pedagogical instrument at the pinnacle of a highly centralized state 
education system, where it played a part in the spiritual grooming of a national 
philosophical elite.51 
Like those other spiritual exercises that he names — “Platonic ascension, 
Cartesian doubt, the Husserlian [epoché]” — Badiou’s too can be understood as an 
“illumination obtained without concept at the end of an initiatory groundwork” (BE, 
238-39). In Badiou’s case initiation occurs through his students and readers learning 
the fundamental Heideggerian paradox itself — a difficult enough undertaking — and 
then using it to transform their relation to themselves such that they become subjects 
                                                
50  See, for examples, Lernould, “Negative Theology and Radical Conceptual 
Purification”; and Theresia Hainthaler, “The ‘School of Antioch’ and Theological Schools in 
the Area of the Patriarchate of Antioch”, in Christ in the Christian Tradition, Volume Two, 
Part Three: The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600. In Continuation of the 
Work of Alois Grillmeier, ed. T. Hainthaler (Oxford, 2013), pp. 218-51. 
51  For more on this, see Baring, The Young Derrida and French Philosophy. 
 38 
open to illumination by the event; although the only thing that actually happens here 
is the act of self-transformation itself. The reason then that Badiou and his followers 
never treat the Heideggerian thought-figure as a contestable doctrine is that it is the 
means of initiation into his extraordinary mathematico-metaphysical regimen, even 
though this figure of thought brings with it almost the entirety of Christian 
metaphysics transposed into a negative ontology. One thus accedes to Badiou’s 
paradoxical discourse not by testing its theoretical or empirical credentials but by 
converting to it and then using it to groom a self for illumination. As an extended 
spiritual exercise Badiou’s discourse thus can neither be falsified nor validated, but it 
can be described in a manner that might help dampen the desire to undertake it. 
 
